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For the past seven years in Doha, Qatar, the annual U.S.-Islamic World Forum has served as the premier convening forum for key leaders from government, civil society, academia, business, religious communities and the media from the across the global Muslim com-munity and the United States. Over the course of three days, these dynamic leaders 
gather for thoughtful discussion and transformative dialogue on issues of mutual importance. 
This past year we witnessed a significant shift in the conversation between the United States 
and global Muslim communities. A new American president has set forth a more positive tone 
for engagement, holding out the promise of a new relationship between the U.S. and Muslim 
communities, as set forth in his historic remarks in Cairo last June. Throughout the Forum, 
we explored whether this altered discourse has transformed the relationship and how it has 
translated into substantive policy recommendations and programs. We also explored and de-
bated key issues of importance to global Muslim communities.  The gathering was all the more 
notable for the presence and participation of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Anwar 
Ibrahim, Saeb Erakat and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, among many others.
This year also saw a change in the structure of the Forum, with the addition of five working 
groups who met for numerous hours throughout the course of the three-day Forum. Led 
by a convener, these working groups focused on specific thematic issues with the goal of 
provoking thoughtful discussion and, where applicable, developing concrete recommenda-
tions. Our five working groups this year included: “The Role of Religious Leaders and Re-
ligious Communities in Diplomacy,” “Democracy and Islamist Parties: Opportunities and 
Challenges,” Empowering Networks for Community Development and Social Change,” 
Scientific, Intellectual and Governance Cooperation on Emerging Environmental Chal-
lenges,” and “New Media to Further Global Engagement.” 
We are pleased to be able to share with you the following paper which is a product of the 
rich workshop discussion which took place at the Forum. However, please note the opin-
ions reflected in the paper and any recommendations contained herein are solely the views 
of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the participants of the working 
groups or The Brookings Institution. 
We would like to take this opportunity to thank the State of Qatar for their partnership 
and vision in convening the Forum in partnership with us. In particular, we thank the 
Emir of Qatar, HRH Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, the Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister of Qatar, HE Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim bin Jabr al-Thani, and the entire staff of 
the Permanent Committee for Organizing Conferences at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
for their support and dedication in organizing the Forum.
Sincerely,
Dr. Stephen R. Grand    Durriya Badani
Fellow and Director    Project Manager
Project on U.S. Relations with the    Project on U.S. Relations with the 
Islamic World     Islamic World
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Bringing new media communications together 
with civil society action and model programs cre-
ates more powerful opportunities to enhance un-
derstanding of these internal conflicts and thereby 
address them in ways that will help accelerate so-
cial and political change. This paper identifies new 
media tools and connection technologies that can 
foster or enhance civic engagement through case 
studies that span the globe.  It was prepared for, 
and its recommendations reflect the proceedings of, 
the New Media working group at the 2010 U.S.-
Islamic World Forum.1
“Change can happen because real time is the new primetime.  It’s a source for news, a platform to 
collaborate, a mouthpiece to mobilize.”
                                                                                —Queen Rania Al Abdullah of Jordan
“The key is to produce something that both pulls people together and gives them something to do.” 
                                                                                —Dr. Henry Jenkins
new Media to Further  
Global enGaGeMent
Co n v e n e r
al-Husein Madhany 
Independent Consultant
wo r K S h o P
abStraCt
This 2010 Brookings workshop paper explores op-
portunities for expanding the instruments available 
to foreign policy-makers to engage weak states.  Frag-
mented and internally divided states can be difficult 
to influence by traditional foreign policy means and 
further can be difficult to understand through tra-
ditional media outlets.  New models of civil society 
action catalyzed by new media—and more broadly 
grounded civic media—show potential for reducing 
internal conflict and promoting social trust among 
tribal, ethnic, and religious groups. 
1 Guiding definitions:  
New media. In this report, new media entails the digital and networked data and communications facilitated by information-communication 
technologies (ICTs). Examples of ICTs relevant to this report are personal computers, laptops, mobile devices, smart phones, digital readers, and 
other hand-held devices. New media then, to use a popular theorist’s definition, has the characteristics of being 1) numerically represented, 2) is 
modular, 3) can be automated, and 4) is variable.  (See Lev Manovich’s The Language of New Media.)
Social media. In our approach, social media is situated within the larger rubric of conversations on new media platforms. By social media I refer to 
the networked communication technologies that facilitate interactivity, collaboration, and especially the ability to produce user-generated content 
and collective organization. Popular examples of these technologies and spaces include: blogging software and blogging communities, wiki spaces, 
social bookmarking and sharing software, and multimedia production and sharing suites such as audio, video, and image manipulation 
technologies. (See Yochai Benkler’s The Wealth of Networks.)
Civic media. Civic media incorporates both new media and social media, but fundamentally is “any use of a medium that fosters civic 
engagement.” While hard news is an obvious example of civic media in most contexts, the changes taking place online and digitally introduce 
alternative conceptions of civic media.  The digital opening provides a freely accessible space to create opportunities for interactions across 
loyalties. For our purposes, civic media comprises community-oriented interactions through the use of connection technologies. Civic media 
allows for the creation of new unexpected communities and fosters an understanding that peoples’ lives are connected to one another.  
Technological connectivity by digital natives occurs simultaneously at local and global levels without the traditional barriers to entry that normally 
limit their regular participation and activism, such as government visas, parent’s permission, and money. (See Center for Future Civic Media at 
MIT: <http://civic.mit.edu>.)
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PreFaCe
tion both from state-sponsored media as well as pri-
vate media, both offline and online, and both for-
mal and informal media—play an important role 
in conveying and facilitating that hostility. Media 
have been used by radical political movements and 
terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, as communica-
tions vehicles to lobby public support for perceived 
grievances; while weakening states’ legitimacy and 
promoting conflict in these societies. On the other 
hand, media and communications infrastructures 
in the Muslim world have so far played a much 
weaker positive role in reducing conflict, due to the 
lack of investment in and incubation of alternative 
non-state sanctioned perspectives in both online 
and offline spaces. 
This workshop paper, prepared for and with recom-
mendations reflecting the proceedings of the New 
Media working group at the 2010 U.S.-Islamic 
World Forum, explores the new challenges facing 
foreign policy toward these weak states. Specifi-
cally, it examines how communications media can 
amplify the impact of these civil society initiatives 
and in particular how information-communication 
technologies (ICTs) are being leveraged in these 
societies to nurture alternative civic commons for 
dialogue and development.  
We live in a world of weak states. The United Nations Security Council was created in 1945 to arbitrate conflicts between states. Up to the end of the 
Cold War, the international order was focused on 
strong states. Today however, the majority of the 
Security Council’s agenda involves securing peace 
in weak states in a world of non-state actors. It was 
during the 1990’s that non-state forces started to 
play a larger role in the Arab and Muslim coun-
tries and became a priority in international politics 
after the end of the Cold War. During that time 
non-state actors, in the form of civil society orga-
nizations (CSOs) and also terrorists—the newer 
threats to national and global security—emerged as 
significant players both in their influence on their 
governments and also in international affairs. Com-
munications media played an important role in the 
shift, empowering citizens to act independently. 
Communications media became an increasingly 
important force both in promoting conflict within 
tribal societies and also in international affairs.  
In an environment where hostility toward the Unit-
ed States is widespread, communications media 
and information environments—an aggregate of 
systems and individuals that disseminate informa-
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Civil SoCiety, new Media and the 
ChallenGe oF weaK StateS
promoting democracy and inhibited freedom of 
the press while imprisoning the country’s most 
prominent secular democrat, Ayman Nour. Simi-
larly, the government of Vladimir Putin in Russia 
has imposed numerous restraints on civil society 
organizations and their funding. When asked how 
the government of a Middle Eastern country had 
managed to reduce the threat from well-supported 
and popular Islamic movements—who are perhaps 
the major non-state actors organized to challenge 
governments in the region—one political scientist 
professor, at a Council on Foreign Relations round-
table in 2008, gave her explanation in the simplest 
possible terms: “They shot a lot of them.”  
Governments that stay in power through force may 
have substantial power, but they lack authority, and 
in that sense they are weak. Authority facilitates 
rule by consent. Weak states lack important capaci-
ties to be effective, including capacities to promote 
economic and political development, precisely due 
to low levels of legitimacy in the eyes of their pub-
lics and low levels of trust in their governments’ 
abilities to provide services. Because they are often 
torn by internal conflict, they are often defined by 
negative agendas of opposition, with little latitude 
for positive action. Discussion of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict assumes that both sides can act to-
ward peace if they only choose to do so. However, 
both Israel and Palestine are deeply divided inter-
nally along political, religious, and cultural lines, 
In less than two decades, non-state actors have come to play roles in developing countries that greatly influence these countries and af-fect their positions in the international order. 
This has happened as civil society organizations and 
communications technology have helped strength-
en the influence of public opinion on political sys-
tems, especially in limiting governmental power. 
In the sense of government power and authority, 
many countries that are today “weak” were “strong” 
two decades ago, before non-state sectors and pub-
lic opinion became significant factors. An anecdote 
from a track-two American diplomat and profes-
sor tells an important piece of the story. He recalls 
flying over Cairo’s City of the Dead with Egypt’s 
President Mubarak in 1995. The President called 
him to the window of the Presidential helicopter 
and remarked, “This is why I no longer have the 
control over the country that I once had”—point-
ing to the forest of television antennas below.
The strengthening of societies has come largely at 
the expense of states (governments). The weaken-
ing of autocratic states opens up possibilities for ex-
panding citizen participation in governments, but 
as threats to state security have increased, govern-
ments have often resorted to increased repression 
to remain in power—curtailing the activities of 
civil society organizations (CSOs) and sometimes 
imprisoning their leaders. In Egypt, for example, 
the Mubarak government clamped down on CSOs 
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autonomy, without significant opposition. CSOs 
can accomplish this through organic, collabora-
tive strategies that promote change without threat-
ening the regimes and therefore face no political 
opposition. Civil society initiatives that advocate 
democratic rights and demand political change in 
the government are those that often threaten re-
gimes and provoke repressive responses from them. 
While most attention focuses on CSOs oriented 
towards democratization and human rights issues 
for political development, many others abound, in-
cluding those working toward social and economic 
development.
Grass roots initiatives, which work organically and 
consensually, create visions of a new future based 
on real experiences. They create powerful stories 
that can be told to change people’s sense of the pos-
sibile. Increasingly CSOs are implementing their 
strategies and actions through strategic commu-
nication and coordination facilitated by ICTs and 
new media. The ability to communicate quickly 
to large populations (i.e., above and beyond those 
who directly experience their work) what is possible 
through narratives about what is in fact happening 
is a powerful instrument that can affect both inter-
nal and foreign policies. 
and these deep divisions limit their governments’ 
freedom of action far more than is commonly 
supposed. These are not problems that afflict the 
“strong states,” including today’s weak states before 
they became weak. 
Weak states also lack the capacity to be effective 
partners in the international order because their 
preoccupying concern with staying in power limits 
their ability to do anything else. It can be argued 
that many countries in the Middle East, including 
Israel, are greatly constrained by domestic political 
forces from acting effectively in their international 
relations.  
The developed countries, including the United 
States, have lacked the capacity until now to assist 
these governments to promote development, both 
economic and political.2 Part of the problem is a 
failure to understand that states are often ineffec-
tive in promoting change; in fact, the non-state sec-
tor, the CSOs, are much better for this purpose. 
The reason is that CSOs can navigate in societal 
spaces closed to government action, both host gov-
ernments’ and foreign governments’ action. With 
certain strategies, CSOs can promote change from 
“inside” other societies more efficiently due to their 
2  An excellent summary of the challenges, together with a broad sketch of how foreign policy can respond to them may be found in A. Lawrence 
Chickering and P. Edward Haley, “Strong Society, Weak State,” Policy Review, June/July 2007. The article is partly based on a book coauthored in 
2006 by A. Lawrence Chickering, Isobel Coleman, and Emily Vargas-Baron on how to make foreign aid strategic, Strategic Foreign Assistance: Civil 
Society in International Security, 2006.
n e w  M e d i a  t o  F u r t h e r  G l o b a l  e n G a G e M e n t
  t h e  S a b a n  C e n t e r  F o r  M i d d l e  e a S t  P o l i C y  a t  b r o o K i n G S
5
new Media, CiviC PartiCiPation and 
youth enGaGeMent
To do so, one needs to understand the positive role 
that young Muslims—often identified as the Mus-
lim world’s “youth bulge”—can play in their societ-
ies and nations, as well as the best ways to facilitate 
their involvement. The findings and case studies from 
the 2010 Brookings New Media working group have 
highlighted developments and innovations taking 
place within young Muslim populations around the 
world. The findings also highlight the growing impor-
tance of digital media and connection technologies for 
Muslim youth as a vital component of their mediated 
interactions with civil society actors, institutions, and 
the U.S. government’s policies towards their countries. 
inForMation SoCiety and SoCio- 
PolitiCal-eConoMiC raMiFiCationS
Globalization, often characterized as the global net-
working of international economies and the trading 
of goods, also fosters greater connectivity between 
societies and leads to a more fluid flow of cultures 
and values. These issues together are usually dis-
cussed in the larger rubric of “the information soci-
ety,” where some contemporary thinkers have gone 
so far to  argue that the creation, structuring, and 
flow of information is now “the key ordering prin-
ciple in society.4” Therefore, globalization is not 
On June 4, 2009, President Obama, de-livering his historic address to the Mus-lim world, said, “I want to particularly say this to young people of every faith, 
in every country—you, more than anyone, have 
the ability to re-imagine the world, to remake this 
world.” Of the 1.57 billion2 Muslims in the world 
today, the vast majority resides in developing na-
tions, and a significant portion of them are young 
citizens.  With a quarter of the predominantly Mus-
lim Middle Eastern and North African population 
currently between the ages of 10 and 24 years old,3 
President Obama’s call to invest in young people 
as agents of change is critically important. Young 
Muslims around the world have the unique poten-
tial to engage in their communities and contribute 
to both social and economic development. To suc-
cessfully tap this potential, it is vital to understand 
contemporary young citizens’ engagement prefer-
ences, and the communication strategies that mesh 
most harmoniously with them. The purpose of this 
working paper is to synthesize the latest findings 
from studies of new media and civic media models 
and contemporary citizen engagement trends. Do-
ing so allows us to see the existing linkages between 
the two, as well as the plausible relationships that 
have not yet successfully been nurtured.  
2  Retrieved from the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life: <http://pewforum.org/docs/?DocID=450>.
3  Retrieved from: <http://thenewservice.wordpress.com/2009/08/07/civicallyengagingmenayouth/>.
4  Webster, Frank, and Raimo Blom. 2004. The information society reader. Routledge.
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and shared utilization economies whose core eco-
nomic drivers are information utilities as opposed 
to factory production. This is as true of the econo-
mies and societies of weak states as it is developed 
nations. If weak states are to become more stable 
and participate in the globalized world, they inevi-
tably must adapt their productive capacity toward 
information-based economies. This cannot happen 
if weak states systematically exclude the future pro-
ductive members of their societies, and limit their 
agency in adapting and contributing to their com-
munities’ narratives.  
Furthermore, the socio-political ramifications of 
the advent of information societies are that social 
activities increasingly revolve around voluntary 
communities, where individuals engage in civil 
society autonomously. Whereas post-industrial so-
cieties of the 20th century existed in civil societ-
ies where organizational membership and formal 
participation was the defining characteristic of 
citizen involvement, citizens’ activities and engage-
ments are more fluid and unrestricted in the 21st 
century. With the growth of networked participa-
tion, citizens who are engaged, do so with differ-
ent participatory tendencies, as social change arises 
from the force of citizen-initiated collective action 
movements and network-organized flash mobs; un-
like the classically organized social movements and 
institution-dependent era from the industrial age.
The above trends and characteristics of an informa-
tion economy should not be viewed as an inevitable 
end to what societies are going to be as the prolif-
eration of information technology increases. The 
on-the-ground situation is far more complex, espe-
cially in weak states and in many Muslim majority 
societies.  For example, many parts of the world do 
not have basic access to employment, let alone clean 
drinking water, not to mention the levels of literacy 
required to take advantage of information society-
based industries. Rather, information society trends 
only reshaping economies, but also profoundly in-
fluencing the social structures of societies, which in 
turn has ramifications for the ways in which citizens 
engage in their societies, both locally and transna-
tionally. Understanding these issues provides key 
insights on how to alleviate negative experiences, 
particularly among young Muslims, and possible 
pathways for improving relationships with them. 
It can also help reshape the limited roles they play 
in their communities toward more inclusive and 
participatory ones.
Though scholars and theorists disagree about the 
exact extent and contours of the information so-
ciety, proponents5 of the idea list some important 
characteristics that determine both the economic 
and socio-political experiences of information-
based societies. These characteristics comprise the 
following pathway to a different economy, and so-
cio-political foundation:
1.   The fundamental function and contribu-
tions of individuals center on mental labor;
2.   This labor leads to the proliferation and mass 
production of cognitive, systematized infor-
mation, technology and knowledge; and
3.   Information networks and data banks be-
come the production and distribution cen-
ters of information and technology goods.
Therefore a country’s economic advantage in an in-
formation society depends on participating in the 
creation of a ‘knowledge frontier.’
Future successful societies then are those that build 
themselves based around intellectual and informa-
tion industries, working to create synergetic econo-
mies. Economies based on synergism, are those 
that are actively transforming themselves from 
commodity economies to synergetic production 
5 Masuda, Y. (2004). Image of the Future Information Society. In The information society reader. pp 15-20. Routledge.
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both locally and transnationally, partnering with 
governments or with one another, to address their 
needs via four spheres of engagement: e-democracy, 
e-mobilization, e-campaigning, and e-government.6
E-democracy.  Here, ICTs are used to enhance com-
munity engagement, citizen deliberation, and civic 
participation. Virtual communities are used by 
citizens to explore hobbies and interests, become 
involved in local community groups and asso-
ciations, join political or religious groups, obtain 
general news and information, find like-minded 
individuals, and connect with people of different 
backgrounds and perspectives. Given the opportu-
nity, those individuals that successfully utilize the 
e-democracy potential of new media are likely to 
participate in vibrant online public spheres and 
build social capital, increase their own knowledge 
and efficacy to address and solve social problems in 
their own communities, as well as find like-minded 
individuals to collectively deliberate, coordinate, 
and mobilize to resolve these issues. While some 
nations, especially closed and autocratic regimes, 
are suspicious of such developments because of the 
challenges they pose to their power, it cannot be de-
nied that whether they accord these developments 
or not, they are happening. For example, a recent 
study of the Iranian blogosphere by researchers 
from Harvard University and Columbia University 
shows that despite the Iranian government’s censor-
ship of the internet, Iran has one of the richest and 
most diverse known online public spheres.7
E-mobilization. ICTs are now also routinely lever-
aged by interest groups and social movements to 
organize online, offline, and hybrid campaigns 
to address their concerns, both locally as well as 
transnationally. Like the horizontal citizen com-
munication possible in e-democracy approaches 
to engagement, e-mobilization works similarly but 
are directions towards which developed nations and 
advanced societies are moving, at different speeds. 
Third-world nations feel the effects of these trends 
either directly or by proxy through their relation-
ships with more advanced states in the globalized, 
networked world.  
The impact of information society trends on de-
veloping societies can be seen most vividly in the 
transnational collective action movements taking 
place between nations. Civil society actors around 
the world increasingly utilize ICTs and digital me-
dia to organize in home countries and abroad to 
address social and political issues. Furthermore, on-
line public spheres and civic commons on the web 
are being created often times organically–and other 
times with strategic investments from their govern-
ments–through these networks, ranging from the 
political blogosphere in North America, interna-
tional protest organizations in Europe, to global 
citizen media campaigns that challenge corporate 
corruption to authoritarian states in Asia and the 
Middle East, respectively.  
iCtS and Civil SoCiety aCtorS
The relationships between and among states and cit-
izens are increasingly mediated by new media com-
munication technologies. State-to-state diplomacy 
is quickly becoming a relic of the past as the barriers 
to entry for citizen diplomacy have been significant-
ly lowered. Citizen engagement no longer requires a 
government visa, parental permission, or even mon-
ey. People are replacing their trust in traditional au-
thorities and authority structures with trust in each 
other. Furthermore, with more than 4.5 billion mo-
bile phones currently in circulation—an increasing 
percentage of which are smart phones—access to 
the digital network is quickly becoming ubiquitous. 
Citizens and civil society actors utilize ICTs to work 
6 Chadwick, Andrew. 2006. Internet politics: states, citizens, and new communication technologies. Oxford University Press.
7  Retrieved from the Berkman Center’s Internet & Democracy Blog: <http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/idblog/2009/02/12/mapping-change-in-the-
iranian-blogosphere/>.
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were given greater agency to design and execute. 
Another very recent example of e-campaigning has 
been the use of text-message fundraising used by 
CSOs and NGOs to raise over $3 million in 30 
hours10 after the earthquake in Haiti.11
E-government. Like e-campaigning strategies that 
make elite politics more accessible to everyday citi-
zens, e-government engagement allow bureaucra-
cies to be more accessible to civil society actors and 
everyday citizens.  ICTs here facilitate transparency, 
improve efficiency, and provide better services to 
constituents. Though e-government engagements 
are heavily transactional in their relationships with 
citizens, unlike e-campaigning and e-mobilization 
trends, which have evolved to be more of a partner-
ship with citizens working towards a collective goal, 
electronic governance programs are vital to improving 
governmental dealings with businesses and individu-
als, reduce costs, and improve the effectiveness of gov-
ernmental services. For developing nations, such as 
is the case for many Muslim societies, advancements 
in e-government infrastructures can facilitate the ser-
vices of political institutions to their publics, reducing 
costs, improving efficiency, and inevitably increasing 
the legitimacy of, and trust in, governments.
CiviC enGaGeMent and diGital divideS
Information-communication technologies and 
digital media allow for key methods to improve in-
clusion and facilitate involvement of societal actors, 
of which e-democracy, e-mobilization, e-campaign-
ing, and e-government are important paradigms 
for future engagement strategies. Both developed 
nations and stable societies have already been able 
to benefit most heavily from these approaches so 
far, while weak states and developing societies have 
been hindered by a multi-tiered digital divide.12
often towards specific collective causes. From classic 
social movements, to modern flash mobs, interest 
groups have worked nationally and internationally 
to influence: environmental legislation, electoral 
outcomes (ex: MoveOn.org), and address human 
rights issues (ex: Mexico’s Zapatistas) through the 
power of ICTs and new media. Social media prac-
tices such as blogging, and ICTs such as mobile 
telephony are vital components of e-mobilization 
work, without which citizen-initiated movements 
would be limited in relying on formal institutions 
that require strong commitments,8 not episodic in-
volvement that allows greater numbers of individu-
als to participate. These forms of political engage-
ment have been shown to have played important 
roles in monitoring elections by democratic activ-
ists in Ghana,9 or mobilizing voters through texting 
in other parts of the world.
E-campaigning: Unlike both e-democracy and e-
mobilization engagement scenarios, e-campaigning 
refers to the vertical communication between citi-
zens and formal political structures, such as gov-
ernments and affiliated bodies (such as parties). 
ICTs are being leveraged heavily by governments 
and states, but often with caution, as these changes 
have the potential to shift the relationship of power 
between the two. The two issues receiving most at-
tention in e-campaigning are related to innovations 
in fundraising as well as interactive tools adopted 
by political campaign web portals to engage citi-
zens. President Barack Obama’s election campaign 
of 2008 serves as the best example for both: fund-
raising was revolutionized by allowing small contri-
butions from the long-tail of advocates, while the 
campaign’s interactive tools allowed everyday citi-
zens to feel as part of a movement by joining online 
communities, creating personalized content, and 
working towards collective causes for which they 
  8  Bennett, W.L. (2003). Communicating Global Activism. Information, Communication, & Society. 6(2), 143-168.
  9 Retrieved from the Center for Strategic & International Studies: <http://csis.org/blog/texting-democracy-mobile-phones-and-elections-africa>.
10 Retrieved from e-politics: <http://www.epolitics.com/2010/01/17/texting-for-haiti-a-breakthrough-for-cell-phone-fundraising/>.
11 <http://www.epolitics.com/2010/01/17/texting-for-haiti-a-breakthrough-for-cell-phone-fundraising/>.
12 Norris, Pippa. 2001. Digital divide: civic engagement, information poverty, and the Internet worldwide. Cambridge University Press.
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nation was between 100-190 for North America 
and Western Europe, while South America, Asia, 
and the Middle East averaged between 25 and 35. A 
more fine-grained analysis of the functions of these 
sites also reveals interesting and important patterns: 
most sites’ features aim towards providing informa-
tion, not improving communication between con-
stituents, and are least likely to provide them with 
opportunities to participate. What this spells for in-
vestments in Muslim societies, is that governments 
who aim merely to create web presences for one-
way information dissemination will not effectively 
engage their publics. However, utilizing interactive 
technologies that actually engage citizens, by provid-
ing them with ways to reach their governments, and 
have their needs and concerns listened to, will fare 
better.
Social divide. The social divide reflects the dispari-
ties between the information rich and the informa-
tion poor. Levels of income, education, race, eth-
nicity, and age, are known predictors of unequal 
information access. Moving towards a more equal 
participation of publics in the information society 
requires that governments and organizations invest 
in bridging the access, literacy, and participation 
gaps prevalent in developing societies. Strategies15 
to do so include: rolling out technical infrastruc-
tures to promote local industry while investing in 
digital skills literacy development for those that 
need it most; investing in leap-frog development by 
rapid infrastructure development via cheap wireless 
technologies and cheap terminal devices; investing 
in basic material and human resource development, 
not ICT infrastructure; or doing both simultane-
ously. As it is already known that levels of literacy 
and access to even basic resources differ widely in 
many developing nations in the Muslim world, 
investments in ICT-powered civil society will not 
While studies have shown that global digital di-
vides exist in both the most advanced societies to 
the poorest nations, many investment scenarios 
and policy initiatives have emerged to address 
these inequalities. However, it is important to note 
that in the Arab world,13 some nations are better 
positioned to jump-start investments in the infor-
mation society and lessen the digital divides than 
others. For example, those nations with the high-
est proportion of internet users (between 20-35%) 
include: the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, 
and Bahrain. Those in the meso-level of internet 
users (between 10-15%) include: Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Those with the 
lowest levels of internet users (less than 10%) in-
clude: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Syria, 
Tunisia, and Yemen. These distinctions, though 
based only on measures of internet penetration, are 
reflective of the vast chasms present from Muslim 
society-to-society, spelling the obvious reality that a 
one-size-fits-all strategy is neither efficient nor ap-
plicable. The review of online engagement models 
offer a multitude of online civic media models from 
which the specific needs of communities and states 
must be adjusted to.
Nevertheless, while internet penetration and the 
percent of users is one basic measure of the digi-
tal divide, these vast differences raise concerns of a 
multi-tiered digital divide existing in the Muslim 
world, at the global, social, and democratic level:
Global divide. The global divide reflects the dis-
parities between internet and information access 
between industrialized and developing societies. 
In 2000, data analysis covering 7221 governmen-
tal agencies from 191 nations worldwide, Cyber-
space Policy Research Group (Cyprg)14 found that 
the average number of government websites per 
13  Wheeler, D.L. (2009). Working around the state: Internet use and political identity in the Arab world. In “Handbook of Internet Politics.” 
Chapter 22.
14 Norris, P. (2004). Deepening Democracy via E-Governance. Working paper.
15 Dijk, Jan A. G. M. van. 2005. The deepening divide: inequality in the information society. SAGE. 
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ceived disrespect and humiliation some experience 
when fragmented from global discourses having to 
about them but without their direct participation. 
Investments in ICT infrastructures and online civic 
spaces can engender both the economic develop-
ment, as well as providing them with alternatives 
to extremist movements to air their grievances and 
(re)negotiate identities, social problems, and expe-
riences.
PartiCiPatory CultureS and  
enGaGeMent PreFerenCeS
Youth engagement is a particularly complex chal-
lenge for developing societies. A major study of 
the United Nations Development Programme on 
“Youth and Violent Conflict: Society and Develop-
ment in Crisis?”16 found that young people, defined 
as between the ages of 15 and 24, are often the most 
at risk members of society, and the largest untapped 
potential source for national development. In turn, 
youth in developing societies are also often the most 
frustrated segment, due to the lack of meaningful 
participation possible for them in their societies 
and nations. Given the lack of opportunities and 
spaces to contribute to their communities, they are 
more likely to join extreme political movements, as 
summarized previously. Tribal societies in particular 
may be at risk of not providing spaces for young 
people to engage in their communities’ economic, 
social, and political spheres. While public attention 
on how to reduce political extremism and religious 
radicalization has usually fixated on understanding 
how terrorists use the internet17 and ICTs,18 policy 
initiatives and investments would be better served 
trying to understand the factors that alienate young 
people in the first place, and in what ways online 
civic spaces can be nurtured to promote organic 
and incremental inclusion of alienated publics.
by themselves increase literacy. However, increas-
ing the capacity for CSOs to better network with 
one-another will lead to better and more efficient 
allocation of resources, as well as innovations for 
addressing problems.
Democratic divide. The democratic divide reflects 
the differences between those who utilize digital 
resources to engage, mobilize and participate in 
public life, through the four spheres of engage-
ment discussed earlier. ICT investments have the 
potential to improve the organizational ties of civic 
society and CSOs, and allow citizen movements 
to network horizontally to engage with their so-
cieties more effectively in collecting resources and 
social capital to address issues. Developed nations 
have countless examples of transnational advocacy 
networks organizing around issues such as: envi-
ronmentalism, globalization, human rights, world 
trade, and conflict resolution. Developing societies 
and weak states are now positioned to tap into this 
potential by investing in strengthening civil society 
actors’ ability to engage and mobilize in addressing 
their needs.
In the context of the Muslim world, considering the 
large number of young people in Muslim-majority 
nations, these weak nations and developing societ-
ies should think critically about investing in social 
and economic development programs that target 
the young. Reducing these divides, and allowing 
more equal as well as autonomous opportunities 
for engaging with their societies is vital to reduce 
the opportunities for these future generations so as 
to prevent alienation from their communities. Sim-
ply put, the reason many disaffected youth resort 
to the appeal of politically extreme movements is 
because of (1) their lack of opportunities to advance 
socially as well as economically; and (2) the per-
16  United Nations Development Programme (2006). Youth and Violent Conflict: Society and Development in Crisis? Retrieved from the United 
Nations Development Programme: <www.undp.org/cpr/whats_new/UNDP_Youth_PN.pdf>.
17 Weimann, Gabriel. 2006. Terror on the Internet: the new arena, the new challenges. US Institute of Peace Press.
18  Cragin, K., Chalk, P., Daly, S.A., & Jackson, B.A. (2007). Sharing the dragon’s teeth: Terrorist groups and the exchange of new technologies. 
Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Retrieved from the RAND Corporation: <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG485/>.
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and consumer politics, 2) mixing music and enter-
tainment with formal political activities such as vot-
ing (ex: Rock The Vote), 3) participating in online 
petitioning, and most innovatively 4) using partici-
patory media and their personal voice to advocate 
for their interests. Some have characterized these as 
a generational shift in how one thinks about civic 
participation, evolving from the assumption that 
citizens should participate in government-centered 
activities and formal civil society organizations, 
towards a networked approach better suiting the 
information society frameworks where citizens—
especially the young—see a diminished sense of ob-
ligation to formal politics and prefer loose networks 
of community action via their personal peer social 
networks organized around ICTs and digital media.
While traditional perspectives on citizen participa-
tion question both the merit and effectiveness of 
more autonomous and prototypical civic engage-
ment preferences, optimists see this as one of the 
best reasons why new media environments can play 
such an important role. Today’s youth demand ear-
ly and frequent access to interactive technologies. 
The universality of this access and use, therefore 
has shifted the onus of the development and imple-
mentation of civic life to youth populations.  Theo-
rists have discussed these issues under the rubrics of 
participatory media or convergence culture, but the 
concepts22 of participation, remediation, and brico-
lage perhaps best define contemporary youth media 
engagement preferences.
Here, participation broadly refers to the increased 
active role of individuals in the consumption and 
production of media; remediation refers to the re-
mixing of old and new media being done through 
the technological affordances digital media; and 
bricolage refers to the personalization of politics and 
The research suggests reasons to be optimistic about 
the potential of digital media to engage Muslim au-
diences, and the positive outcomes of greater youth 
engagement. A comprehensive study of youth en-
gagement in the Middle East19 found that youth 
participation in civic activity is integral to their 
inclusion in their societies. For example, youth 
inclusion in civic participation often also leads to 
positive development outcomes, by facilitating col-
lective action, yielding more effective services, and 
reducing corruption.  Youth exclusion, on the other 
hand, increases the likelihood of deviant behaviors, 
such as crime and political extremism. While im-
proving access to education and addressing eco-
nomic issues must remain a priority in addressing 
the needs of young people in the Muslim world, 
a key component in doing so should incorporate 
young people in promoting civic engagement. Re-
cent scholarship in citizenship studies has identified 
that young people are interested and willing to par-
take in civic and political life, though they are more 
likely to self-define the kinds of participation they 
find valuable. Whereas advanced Western democra-
cies have been witnessing a steady decline of young 
people’s interest and involvement in public life, 
some have argued that the networked information 
society is promoting a civic culture that places more 
value and importance in self-defined conceptions of 
civic engagement. Here, scholars have noticed that 
though young people are likely to read the news 
less, vote less, and care about party politics less,20 
they continue to be interested in volunteer activi-
ties and consumer politics where they have greater 
agency in self-defining not only what is political, 
but the way in which they address the causes that 
interest them.
Contemporary examples of these engagements21 in-
clude preferences for: 1) branded political discourse 
19  Assad, R., & Barsoum, G. (2007, September). The Middle East Youth Initiative Working Paper: Youth Exclusion in Egypt. Retrieved from the 
Middle East Youth Initiative: <http://www.shababinclusion.org/content/document/detail/540/>. 
20 Zukin, Cliff. 2006. A new engagement?: political participation, civic life, and the changing American citizen. Oxford University Press, U.S. 
21 Bennett, W. Lance. 2008. Civic life online: learning how digital media can engage youth. MIT Press. 
22 Deuze, Mark. 2007. Media work. Polity.
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2.  Providing spaces for Muslim youth to par-
ticipate in their communities, states, and 
societies reduces tendencies for deviant be-
haviors, while channeling their potential for 
social and economic development;
3.  Strategies for inclusion must adapt to young 
peoples’ contemporary engagement prefer-
ences, especially their need for greater au-
tonomy and agency in defining and shaping 
their participatory behaviors; and
 
4.  Digital media, being an integral part of their 
social lives, are a crucial ingredient and space 
for investment.
Online public spheres have organically proliferated 
in many sectors of the world, while many programs 
are also experimenting with online civic commons 
models, which are reviewed below.
increasing focus on citizens’ individualized “voice” 
as a crucial component of civic engagement (for 
more on these topics, see recent publications of the 
MacArthur Foundation’s Digital Media & Learn-
ing initiative, http://digitallearning.macfound.org). 
Put more simply, today’s cohort of young citizens 
do not care to be told what to do and how to par-
ticipate in their communities. This is particularly 
true in developing societies where they experience 
daily dissatisfaction in the way their communities 
work, they have little faith in the old habits. Rath-
er, they prefer to participate, but on their terms. 
However, it is up to strategic investments in cre-
ating the proper spaces for socialization and posi-
tive engagement, and curtailing the possibilities of 
young people falling into alienation and extreme 
mobilization.  
The most important take-aways here include:
1.  Social and economic development in the 
Muslim world, and especially in weak states 
should aim to better include young people;
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SoCial Media, online PubliC SPhereS 
and youth enGaGeMent
23 Retrieved from The New York Times Magazine: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/magazine/18web2-0-t.html>.
24  Al-Saggaf, Yeslam. (2006). The Online Public Sphere in the Arab World: The War in Iraq on the Al Arabiya website. Retrieved from the Journal 
of Computer-Mediated Communication: <http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol12/issue1/al-saggaf.html>.
25  Abdulla, Rasha A. (2007). Islam, Jihad, and Terrorism in Post-9/11 Arabic Discussion Boards. Retrieved from the Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication: <http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol12/issue3/abdulla.html>. 
the MuSliM (youth) CiviC web SPhere
Studies of the online Arab public sphere are lim-
ited, but of those that have been conducted, one 
such example is a study of the Al-Arabiya24 website. 
This research identified that online discussion spac-
es are vital for allowing audiences to discuss public 
issues, input their own version of the truth, and 
bring together a diverse set of perspectives; a set of 
findings that should not be easily overlooked con-
sidering the relative lack of open discussion spaces 
allowed to citizens under most autocratic regimes. 
The fact that these spaces exist in public spheres of 
states that are traditionally controlled and closed, 
the Al-Arabiya website is surely a game-changing 
development.
A separate study25 of the three most popular Arabic-
language online message boards (Masrawy: www.
masrawy.com; Islam Online: www.islamonline.net; 
and Arabia: www.arabia.com) found that a vast por-
tion of online discussants on these popular public 
venues engaged in nuanced discussions regarding 
the attacks of 9/11. These engaged citizens partici-
pating in political discussions mostly condemned 
1 3
Online civic commons such as discussion boards and newspaper commenting sec-tions nurture not only online civic en-gagement, but also allow audiences to 
work through, and even respond to, contentious 
issues that challenge their identities, such as acts of 
violence committed in the name of their religion. 
These innovative online civic spaces have so far 
mostly come about by grassroots developments and 
citizen-led action and mobilization (and are usu-
ally autonomous of state control, and often enough 
in contention to them), but lack the resources re-
quired to fully actualize their engagement capabili-
ties and require concerted investment in order to 
draw out their benefits to civil societies and social 
development. This section highlights some of these 
prototypical examples with a focus on youth atten-
tion, and juxtaposes them to similar models from 
developed nations and advanced societies. By un-
derstanding what is already happening in Muslim 
societies in this area, along with what is working 
best in advanced nations, policy makers and digi-
tal diplomats23 can begin to identify the gaps and 
future directions for investing in online civic com-
mons and spaces for youth engagement.
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increase the potential for networked young Muslim 
citizens to see a wider and more pluralistic segment 
of Muslims around the world. By being exposed to 
differences and alternatives, young people might 
find not only others going through similar experi-
ences, but also alternatives and solutions to their 
predicaments. This is to say that increasing access 
and opportunity to experience diversity and differ-
ence may nurture tolerance as well.  In fact, online 
portals such as Islam Online28 provide global Mus-
lim audiences opportunities to engage a wide range 
of social, political, and cultural issues, via special-
ized content in the following categories: News and 
Analysis, Islamic Law, Islamic Normativity, Muslim 
Affairs, Spiritual Purification and Development, 
Euro-Muslims, Health & Sciences, Science and 
Hadith, Culture & Art, Family, Youth, and Dawah.
Another cutting-edge analysis of the online pub-
lic sphere in the Muslim world has been a recent 
study29 of Iran’s vast and diverse political and cul-
tural blogosphere. This massive computational 
social network mapping and content analysis of 
Persian blogs found that most Iranian bloggers 
are young and democratic, and often critical of 
the Iranian regime. The full volume of the Iranian 
blogosphere is difficult to pin, but is estimated to be 
around 60,000 active blogs ranging in content and 
ideology, with the largest hubs coalescing around: 
secularist-reformists, religious-conservatives, and 
poetry and literature enthusiasts. The analysis also 
concludes that while offline Iranian society is known 
to be heavily censored by governmental authorities, 
online censorship and control is not as pervasive as 
expected—due partially to the advantage of peer-
to-peer networking, whereby much of the Iranian 
blogosphere “remains a viable arena of political 
contestation and forum for viewpoints challenging 
the attacks as a criminal act contradicting the teach-
ings of their faith, and while some saw the attacks 
as having some justification, most understood it 
as a political, not a religious issue. This is another 
example of the positive developments that occur 
when citizens are given the spaces and autonomy 
to understand events such as 9/11. This research 
shows that Muslim publics are willing and capable 
of concluding through open online discussions that 
there is a contradiction between their religious be-
liefs and practices, and the violent actions perpe-
trated in the name of their faith. 
In one of the few in-depth, qualitative analyses of 
the online Muslim spaces, el-Nawawy and Khamis 
(2009)26 investigated Islam Online (www.islamon-
line.net), Amr Khaled (www.amrkhaled.net), and 
Islam Way (www.islamway.com). These spaces have 
clear religious overtones, many dealing with the 
contemporary religious issues in Muslim societies. 
However, they are much more, representing spaces 
where Muslims create and negotiate their identities 
both globally and in relation to the state powers 
and actors. For example, Amr Khaled was a popular 
preacher in Egypt until he was banned for political 
reasons by Egyptian authorities from the country. 
But using his website and global satellite channels, 
he continues to engage “young Arab youth’s con-
fidence in their ability to improve their lives and 
achieve their goals in life through a balance between 
piety and hard work […] [embodying a] message to 
the Arab and Muslim youth, which is that ‘True 
change [can come] into existence, not by restricting 
thought and forcing direction, but by accepting ac-
countability and believing in one’s ability’.”27
This study also highlights the transnational char-
acteristics that embody these communities, and 
26 El-Nawawy, Mohammed, and Sahar Khamis. 2009. Islam Dot Com: Contemporary Islamic Discourses in Cyberspace. Macmillan.  
27 Ibid, 13-14.
28  Graf, B. (2008). IslamOnline.net: Independent, interactive, popular. Arab Media & Society, January (2008), 1-21. Retrieved from Arab Media & 
Society: <http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=576>.
29  Kelly, J., & Etling, B. (2008). Mapping Iran’s Online Public: Politics and Culture in the Persian Blogosphere. Berkman Center Research 
Publication. No. 2008-01. Retrieved from the Berkman Center for Internet & Society: <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/2008/
Mapping_Irans_Online_Public>. 
n e w  M e d i a  t o  F u r t h e r  G l o b a l  e n G a G e M e n t
  t h e  S a b a n  C e n t e r  F o r  M i d d l e  e a S t  P o l i C y  a t  b r o o K i n G S
1 5
public sphere for Afghanistan.  Another contrasting 
example is that of Raed al-Saeed,33 of Saudi Arabia, 
who has become a popular blogger after he created 
a 6-minute YouTube video responding to Western 
audiences. Al-Saeed joins approximately 500 blog-
gers in Saudi Arabia ever-so-slowly liberalizing the 
information environment of a traditionally ultra-
conservative society.
In summary, advancements and developments in 
the online public spheres of Muslim societies have 
thus far occurred organically, despite the crackdown 
of autocratic regimes and closed societies. Never-
theless, they are perhaps the single most important 
trend reshaping the political cultures and social-
ization of young people. While many disaffected 
youth move towards alienation and radicalization, 
engaging in prototypical civic engagement via on-
line civic spaces allows them important alternatives 
to extremism. CSOs and civil society investments 
that not only make use of this, but more impor-
tantly, adopt ICTs and digital technologies would 
be best served investing in these key developments. 
the weStern youth CiviC web SPhere
Recent analyses of the North American youth civic 
web spheres have found many similarities in how 
young people use the web for civic and social pur-
poses, with the main distinction being greater ac-
cess to more sophisticated tools and online com-
munities. For example, a comprehensive analysis34 
of the 90 most-trafficked U.S. youth civic engage-
ment sites found a rich presence of many civil so-
ciety actors investing in online youth engagement: 
1) traditional interest groups (ex: Sierra Club), 2) 
brick-and-mortar youth organizations (ex: YMCA), 
the ruling ideology of the Islamic Republic.” Sim-
ply put, one of the best forces for democratization 
in Iran is not necessarily the strong power initiatives 
of political economic coercion, but the slow yet 
consistent nurturing of a new generation of citizens 
that is pluralistic, less antagonistic, and more recep-
tive to change. Policy makers and digital diplomats 
should take note that this cannot happen without 
the rich online public sphere that is shaping their 
political socialization in Iran. 
Like the experiences of other youth around the 
world, Muslim young people also use the internet 
to navigate and negotiate their identities as they 
reach adolescence. In fact, many Arab and Mus-
lim internet users do not see ICTs as overt politi-
cal tools, but rather as platforms which allow them 
to “(1) build a political consciousness; (2) build-
ing social networks and knowledge capital; and (3) 
transgress boundaries, especially lines of gender, 
nation, and social class.”30 Relying on blogging as 
a popular tool to engage in these activities, blog-
gers in the Muslim world—particularly in the Arab 
world—have begun to engage in three forms31 of 
blogging: 1) as activists (direct involvement in po-
litical movements, coordinating political action, 
spreading information, and magnifying the impact 
of contentious politics), 2) as bridge bloggers (ad-
dressing Western audiences, communicating their 
cultures and explaining their societies), and 3) as 
public-sphere bloggers (not directly involving 
themselves in political movements, but engaging 
public affairs in general). A recent example in-
cludes that of Nasim Fekrat,32 a self-trained jour-
nalist and blogger and founder of the Association 
of Afghan Blog Writers, who is recruiting bloggers 
from around Afghanistan in cultivating an online 
30  Wheeler, D.L. (2009). Working around the state: Internet use and political identity in the Arab world. In “Handbook of Internet Politics.” 
Chapter 22.
31 Douai, A. (2009). Offline Politics in the Arab Blogosphere in “International blogging: Identity, politics, and networked publics.”
32 Stern, J. (2008). Meet Afghanistan’s Most Fearless Blogger. Retrieved from Slate Magazine, Jul 3, 2008: <http://www.slate.com/id/2194806/>.
33 Schmidle, N. (2008). Inside Saudi Arabia. Retrieved from Slate Magazine, Apr 17, 2008: <http://www.slate.com/id/2189366/entry/2189367/>.
34  Bennett, W.L., Wells, C., & Freelon, D.G. (2009). Communicating Citizenship Online: Models of Civic Learning in the Youth Web Sphere. 
A Report from the Civic Learning Online Project. Retrieved from the Civic Learning Online Project: <http://www.engagedyouth.org/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2009/02/communicatingcitizeshiponlinecloreport.pdf>.
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spaces for young people to gather and discuss, 
and from these grassroots discussions, more 
substantive civic engagement sometimes mo-
bilizes. TIG web’s mark of distinction howev-
er is in the massive forum spaces where young 
people actively discuss issues of a wide range 
from global importance (ex: terrorism, reli-
gious violence, HIV, natural disasters, etc.) to 
deeply personal (ex: personal struggles, sexual 
identities).  In this community, youth from 
around the world engage each another, and 
resolve differences, in ways that before would 
have been difficult to even conceive.
Studies of the European youth civic web sphere 
highlight stark similarities with the North Ameri-
can sphere. Researchers investigating youth engage-
ment sites35 in Hungary, the Netherlands, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom recently 
concluded that:
1.   The internet is an important tool for al-
ready engaged young people. Focus groups 
of these young people found that already 
active young citizens used the internet as a 
‘hub’ for their civic and political activities;
2.   The internet is also an important resource 
for minorities (political, ethnic, regional or 
religious)—“it’s open architecture—the fact 
that it opens up spaces for voices to be heard 
and for people to meet and interact—pro-
vides a basis for these groups, and for their 
expressions of and debates about identity, 
in ways that the traditional media landscape 
has not done;
3.   The internet is a public sphere for a num-
ber of young people in Europe. The internet 
opens up spaces for public, or semi-public, 
discussions between young people;
3) governmental agencies and political parties (ex: 
Peace Corps, BarackObama.com), and 4) online-on-
ly youth civic communities (ex: Do Something, Tak-
ingItGlobal). The analysis also found that some of the 
richest examples of successful online engagement sites 
were from the online-only category, which engaged 
in cultivating innovative methods to illicit youth civic 
participation. The following highlights three of the 
most interesting and innovative communities:
1.  Youth Venture (www.genv.net): This online-
only community allows young people to cre-
ate and implement their own civic projects, 
form teams, and complete action-plans. The 
community provides information and how-
to-guides for fundraising, networking, and 
event planning;
2.  Do Something (www.dosomething.org): 
This online-only community allows young 
people to learn about and participate in 
youth-designed campaigns on issues like: 
animal welfare, discrimination, environ-
ment, HIV and sexuality, poverty, war, 
peace and politics, education, health and 
fitness, international human rights, and vio-
lence and bullying.  Shaped heavily by the 
site-designers values and topics of interest, 
the site provides a more guided approach to 
youth civic engagement online, but manages 
to keep young people involved through an 
active investment in networking with other 
sites where young people are present, such 
as: Facebook, MySpace, YouTube, and Twit-
ter; and
3.  Taking It Global (www.tigweb.org): TIG web 
is perhaps one of the most successful online 
communities examined in the U.S. youth civic 
web sphere, given its wide and global appeal. 
The site offers a wide array of collaboration 
35  Hirzalla, F., & van Zoonen, L. (2008). Uses of the Web for Civic Participation. Young People, the Internet and Civic Participation. No. 028357. 
Retrieved from CivicWeb: <http://www.civicweb.eu/content/view/28/7/>.
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online engagement spaces, young people will have 
greater options to exercise their voices, express their 
concerns, and discuss their grievances—instead of 
resorting to alienation and radicalization.
Unfortunately, many governments, especially in 
closed societies and weak states are suspicious of 
non-state organizations’ activities because of the 
lack of control they have over their actions. Par-
ticularly, those countries that have traditionally 
controlled political discourse have attempted, often 
in futility, to stop the proliferation of digital media 
and online civic spaces. In this section, some of the 
most recent high-profile examples in the Muslim 
world are highlighted. The negative ramifications 
of these examples to the legitimacy and capacity of 
certain countries to govern effectively further sup-
ports the call to invest in online civic commons 
where productive communication can take place, 
and positive engagement can grow from it.
ICTs and collective-action in Pakistan’s state of 
emergency and massive floods
Pakistan is a developing nation rife with low levels 
of literacy and basic access to resources. Between 
March 2007 and February 2008, this nation experi-
enced some striking examples of citizen-led mobili-
zation in response to then President General Pervez 
Musharraf ’s decision to suspend the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court. Beginning with an online peti-
tion in response to the suspension, over a thousand 
signatures were collected to protest the decision 
through circulating the petition over email lists and 
blogs. Following this, citizen-media outfits, such as 
Dawn, an English-language media group, organized 
citizen journalists to generate news, discussion, 
and political mobilization in response. According 
to Huma Yusuf of MIT’s Center for Future Civic 
Media, “Digital technologies that were harnessed 
during this time for political advocacy, community 
4.  Despite the lack of any simple cause and ef-
fect relationships between specific websites 
and young people’s civic engagement, tools 
which allow file sharing and user-participa-
tion were very important in sustaining youth 
interest;
5.  Young people on European youth civic sites 
were most interested in: music, movies and 
news, and least interested in formal politics; 
and
6.  Six factors underpin the expressed interest in 
different websites: entertainment, life style, 
digital culture, social justice issues, new 
social movement and spiritual issues and 
electoral politics. While interest in electoral 
politics was the lowest, young people are 
most interested in environmental, new social 
movement, and spirituality-related issues.  
in the abSenCe oF Citizen enGaGeMent 
. . . Cyber SeCurity vS. ContentiouS 
Mobilization
Recent events such as the arrests of Northern Vir-
ginia men seeking jihad in Pakistan,36 and Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian suspect of 
the attempted Christmas day bombing plot, have 
raised concerns about the potential of the internet 
being used by extremists to recruit and radicalize 
Muslim youth. However, as Mona Eltahawy of 
Time Magazine37 points out, this news is not new 
news.  Extremists and terrorists bent on violence 
have and will continue to attempt to use technolo-
gies and strategies for their purposes. Rather than 
focusing on closing the internet due to these risks, 
our argument is that this is precisely the reason why 
greater investments must be placed in cultivating 
online spaces to challenge jihadist rhetoric and re-
cruiting.  With the presence of richer, more diverse, 
36 Retrieved from the Washington Post: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/10/AR2009121000919.html>.
37 Retrieved from Time Magazine <http://www.time.com/time/video/player/0,32068,61644663001_1953518,00.html>.
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and to track—in real time—the affected areas and 
relief supply chains. This was the same system that 
was tried and tested during the Haiti earthquake, 
and worked. Anybody can use the system via text 
message, e-mail, the internet, Facebook, or Twitter 
and the results are posted in real time at http://pak-
report.org. Pakistan has over 100 million mobile 
phone users, and therefore has the potential to be 
the largest deployment in history of a civic media 
toolkit around a natural disaster.
ICTs and contentious mobilization in Iran’s  
general elections
Similarly, in June 2009, having strictly enforced 
censorship of dissident voices in its offline public 
sphere,40 Iran experienced the full force of mobile 
and digital technologies’ uses for organizing dem-
onstrations in response to its election, by local and 
transnational activists. “Civil society in Iran is in-
credibly wired. Estimates of the number of blogs in 
Iran range anywhere from 40,000 to 700,000.  Even 
the Revolutionary Guard has developed a strategy 
to generate 10,000 blogs (though the Basij militias 
have not proven up to this particular task).  The Bu-
reau for the Development of Religious Web Logs 
offers blogging workshops to Iran’s clerics.  During 
the protests, even the most apolitical bloggers cov-
ered the demonstrations, and traffic at the dominant 
blogs swelled. There is one mobile phone for every 
two people in Iran, and in urban areas, the vast ma-
jority of residents have a mobile phone. There are 
more than 80 internet service providers operating 
throughout the country. Young people—a relatively 
large segment of the country’s population—are par-
ticularly sophisticated with digital technologies, so-
cial networking or sociable media sites.”41
A particular rallying cry for the protests occurred when 
video footage of Neda Agha-Soltan whose shooting 
organizing, and hyperlocal reporting include cell 
phones, camera phones (mobile-connected cam-
eras), SMS text messages, online mailing lists, and 
internet broadcasts (live audio and visual streams). 
Meanwhile, popular new media platforms utilized 
during the Pakistan Emergency include blogs (live 
blogging), YouTube, Flickr, Facebook and other so-
cial networking or sociable media sites.”38  
Though literacy is below 50%, and only a small 
fragment of the total population have access to the 
internet, for a nation with the size of Pakistan, over 
17 million citizens had access to this phenomenal 
period of networked public sphere creation, and 
online political mobilization. Though the govern-
ment strictly controlled other media outlets such 
as television and radio, they were not as success-
ful in restricting civic activities taking place online. 
Through the combined uses of digital activism, citi-
zen journalism, and mobile phone uses, disaffected 
Pakistani citizens broadcasted live-coverage of gov-
ernmental corruption such as rigged elections and 
political suppression.
The very same civic media platforms which were 
used in 2008 to restore the country’s popular Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court after General Pervez 
Musharraf ’s decision to suspend Iftikhar Muham-
mad Chaudhry are being utilized again in 2010. 
This time, however, they are being used to help 
in the relief efforts for Pakistan’s massive floods. 
United Nations experts expect the scale of the hu-
manitarian crisis to exceed the combined total of 
three recent major natural disasters: Haiti’s Janu-
ary earthquake, the 2004 tsunami and the 2005 
Pakistan earthquake. By employing both the Inter-
net and mobile technology, Faisal Chohana, TED 
Fellow39 and an Islamabad-based innovator, initi-
ated this application of the open-source Ushahidi 
platform, primarily to avoid duplicate relief efforts 
38  Retrieved from the Center for Future Civic Media: <http://civic.mit.edu/watchlistenlearn/old-and-new-media-converging-during-the-pakistan-
emergency-march-2007-february-2008>.
39 Retrieved from Technology, Entertainment, Design: <http://www.ted.com/fellows/view/id/9>.
40 Retrieved from the Committee to Protect Journalists: <http://www.cpj.org/mideast/>.
41 Retrieved from Miller-McCune: <http://www.miller-mccune.com/politics/iranelection-1643.print>.
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public sphere against deviant civic voices. Alas, 
powerful corporations, such as Google, are now 
challenging even its most advanced censorship sys-
tems.45 Google reports that in addition to its own 
intellectual property, over twenty large companies 
had come under attack from hackers originating 
from China, particularly going after Chinese hu-
man rights activists—resulting  in Google’s decision 
of possibly terminating its relationship with China: 
“These attacks and the surveillance they have un-
covered—combined with the attempts over the past 
year to further limit free speech on the web—have 
led [Google] to conclude that we should review 
the feasibility of our business operations in China. 
[Google has] decided we are no longer willing to 
continue censoring our results on Google.cn, and 
so over the next few weeks we will be discussing 
with the Chinese government the basis on which 
we could operate an unfiltered search engine within 
the law, if at all. We recognize that this may well 
mean having to shut down Google.cn, and poten-
tially our offices in China.”
The above four case studies reveal that the more 
governments attempt to suppress citizens’ voices 
and need to engage in political discussion, online 
technologies provide them with the capacity to find 
new and alternative spaces to do so. First, while the 
Musharraf government tried its best to suppress 
Pakistani citizens’ mobilization in response to its 
suspension of the Chief Justice, citizen-journalism, 
in combination with ICTs and mobile phones, dealt 
decisive challenges to the Pakistani governments’ le-
gitimacy and capacity to govern.  Similarly, as the 
Iranian government engaged in forced suppression 
of demonstrations and protests, Iranian activists in 
cohort with transnational supporters broadcasted 
live the brutal suppression of the regime. Second, 
even advanced nations with significant public 
and death captured on cell phone footage, was spread 
throughout the web and elicited worldwide condem-
nations of the Iranian government. These events al-
lowed movements in Iran to coalesce with transna-
tional supporters to draw significant coverage of, and 
cause significant damage to, the Iranian government’s 
legitimacy and capacity to govern effectively.
New Media and the Gaza War
In addition to grassroots mobilization facilitated 
by ICTs, more established organizations, such as Al 
Jazeera, have increasingly begun to build the tools 
and capacity to effect the scenarios of issues as signif-
icant as military warfare. In December 2008, when 
Israel launched its major offensive in the Gaza strip, 
Al Jazeera was present primarily through new media 
technologies to report on-the-ground realities of Ga-
zans, despite Israel’s tight information control and 
public relations expertise.  Riyaad Minty, Head of 
Social Media at Al Jazeera, successfully implement-
ed popular tools such as Twitter, and lesser-known 
citizen-reporting digital technologies, such as Usha-
hidi, to create maps of the conflict in real-time.42 
Al Jazeera’s new media platform “Your Media”43 also 
allowed people to contribute their own stories of 
the carnage and chaos to the website before the Is-
raeli military blacked out communications. While 
governments engage in closing-down access, orga-
nizations such as Al Jazeera become more credible 
and trustworthy in the eyes of the public precisely 
because of their openness and willingness to incor-
porate citizens into their work.44
Corporate responses to the Great Firewall of 
China
China has been perhaps the most effective and so-
phisticated state in carefully controlling its online 
42  See <http://www.slideshare.net/riyaadm/media140-sydney-case-study-riyaad-minty> and retrieved from media140: <http://media140.
org/?p=722>.
43 Retrieved from ammartalk: <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sQ0b9TX8_Lg>.
44 Retrieved from Al Jazeera English: <http://english.aljazeera.net/focus/war_on_gaza/2009/01/200912112395904603.html>.
45 Retrieved from the Official Google Blog: <http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html>.
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expertise, but inevitably face increasing difficulty 
in staying closed and unreceptive to the needs 
and desires of their citizens. In Muslim-majority 
developing societies especially, governments that 
focus instead in building their capacity to provide 
services will fare best in growing their support, 
trust, and cooperation from their constituencies. 
ICTs and digital media, though they can and are 
used by terrorists for violent ends, are real, and 
will need to be combated. However, the correct 
response is to strengthen the capacity of their civ-
il societies so that citizens can orient themselves 
toward mutually beneficial development, not co-
erced alienation and radicalization.
relations expertise and strict control of informa-
tion, such as Israel and China, have had their 
power severely challenged by transnational corpo-
rations such as Al Jazeera and Google, respective-
ly. When Israel launched its major offensive and 
bombing of Gaza, Al Jazeera was on the ground, 
engaging in a sophisticated campaign of citizen-
journalism, conflict coverage, and war-journaling, 
sharing the most gruesome details regarding the 
effects of modern warfare. Similarly, Google is 
now challenging China regarding its human rights 
violations, and censorship of information that 
challenges its legitimacy. These cases showcase the 
common thread that closed regimes can and do 
exercise censorship at various levels of success and 
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46  Howard, Philip N. (2010). The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam (Oxford Studies in 
Digital Politics).
organize and mobilize toward common democratic 
goals.  The massive protests that broke out in Tehran 
after the questionable re-election of Ahmadinejad 
as President of Iran are a timely example.  Informa-
tion, including visual information flowed in abun-
dance within Iran and from Iran to Arab countries 
and even to the West. Activists based locally in Iran, 
collaborating with others outside Iran showed a so-
phisticated understanding of bypassing traditional 
censorship filters. The end result, though it is too 
soon to pen the final chapter, was that mobilized 
and engaged citizens were able to challenge the 
legitimacy of autocratic leadership through broad-
casting their experience to the global public.  Young 
people in Iran showed a highly sophisticated under-
standing of how Iranian citizens could utilize indi-
rectly the hardware and software of other countries 
in order to circumvent the attempted government 
censorship.  These bloggers and users of social net-
working sites are giving the world new access to the 
internal life of societies and states and giving civil 
society a new peaceful avenue of social change and 
advocacy. The importance of the Iranian example 
cannot be over emphasized, but it should also be 
understood correctly. “Technology is neither good 
nor bad, nor is it neutral. Democratic revolutions 
are not caused by new information technologies. 
But in the Muslim world, democratization is no 
longer possible without them.”46
Communication is the key to the transforma-tion of developing societies because of its ability to connect people and common in-terests. It is true in families, in relationships 
between people, and in relationships among whole 
peoples. What might be called “global communica-
tion” tells the large mythic stories that govern broad 
relationships (such as between the Palestinians and 
the Israelis and between the Arab countries and the 
United States), while personal communication en-
gages individuals, promotes social trust, and lays the 
foundation for deep collaboration and partnership. 
The above review highlights the ways in which com-
munication, especially internet technologies, are con-
necting citizens and civil society actors. Future policy 
initiatives to engage Muslim communities, especially 
young people, cannot ignore these developments. In-
vesting in information-infrastructures, both broadly 
by proliferating ICTs through greater access and lit-
eracy, and particularly by fostering youth civic com-
mons, should be seen as investing in the long-term 
development of civil society institutions in develop-
ing societies. These civic commons allow youth from 
the Arab and Muslim world to engage in discussions 
and explorations of identity, while also connecting 
with like-minded individuals transnationally.   
Furthermore, the nurturing of information society 
facilitates the possibilities for non-state dissenters to 
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and North America have developed some innova-
tive models to engage young people in public issues 
and political and civic engagement. These spaces, 
if created and invested in adequately, have already 
been demonstrated to serve as important spaces for 
transnational engagement, discussion, and even in-
ternal societal cohesion.
Communication technologies that promote a civic 
media culture therefore are very sharp tools that 
should be utilized to further Global Engagement 
policy efforts. Civic engagement empowers citizens 
by expanding identity and loyalty beyond tribe and 
religion. Civic engagement is the key to promoting 
a culture of citizenship that is essential to advanc-
ing developing societies and weak states towards 
modern information societies. Investments in civil 
society through IT infrastructures and online civic 
commons, however, will only be as helpful in de-
signing and implementing such an organic change 
strategy if the strategy is substantively grounded in 
allowing young people to engage and participate 
in the ways that appeal to them. Promoting par-
ticipation of young people requires more spaces 
for these young people to self-define, discuss, and 
engage civic issues. Without the substance of real 
participation and engagement, alienation will only 
increase; and increased communication will only 
intensify fragmentation and instability. For these 
reasons, it is essential that equal weight be given 
to development and implementation of engage-
ment strategies that invest in technologies which 
nurture spaces for youth engagement, and reduce 
alienation. 
For example, the Knight Foundation has seeded 
many examples of such cutting-edge platforms 
for civic engagement: Facebook co-founder Chris 
Hughe’s JUMO is building the infrastructure 
to connect individuals with organizations work-
ing towards global change; Code for America is 
We continue to witness the Obama Administration 
embrace technology and innovation. Its continual 
promotion of young talent to carve out new areas 
of Global Engagement, such as in the field of digital 
diplomacy,47 is reflective of how critically important 
new media and ICTs are to our shared global security 
interests with the Muslim world. Critics may argue 
that new media is overrated, and it may well be, but 
only in the short term. New media is underrated in 
the long term. The overarching objective of bringing 
together the findings in this workshop paper is to 
consider new strategies for leveraging the affordances 
of digital media and information-communication 
technologies (ICTs) in assisting weak states and de-
veloping stronger societies in the Muslim world.
Communication is a strategic foreign policy tool 
for the Middle East and Islamic World. Interactive, 
digital, new media communication technologies 
can play important roles in what people are doing 
to promote economic and social change, and—in 
more intimate, personal ways—it can intensify 
interactions between people and strengthen the 
personal relationships between them. Investments 
in future civic media are currently recognized by 
many governments and initiatives within advanced 
democracies. For example, a recent report on Can-
ada identifies that these investments48 promote so-
cial innovation, democratic entrenchment, political 
inclusion, and societal unity.49 Furthermore, trans-
national engagement is also a key issue that was 
identified in the report, and the opportunities for 
promoting these connections are proliferating.  
The gaps that were highlighted between the devel-
oped world, not only at the levels of the digital di-
vide on access, use and literacy, but also at the level 
of online civic commons, will soon narrow. While 
the online public spheres of the Muslim world are 
developing independent of any concerted effort 
and investment, the youth civic spheres of Europe 
47 Retrieved from The New York Times Magazine: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/magazine/18web2-0-t.html>.
48 Retrieved from Canada25: <http://www.canada25.com/policy.html>.
49 Retrieved from: <http://docs.docstoc.com/pdf/1878282/ea8f4b39-6a2a-46fb-a2c4-5e802cf01aab.pdf>.
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government officials that are conducting outreach to 
the Muslim world, such as Rashad Hussain (Envoy 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Organiza-
tion of the Islamic Conference) and Farah Pandith 
(Special Representative to Muslim Communities 
for the Department of State), should each expand 
their team to hire experts in the space of digital di-
plomacy in order to integrate and build new media 
projects to promote participatory cultures and civil 
societies in the Muslim world. Finally, continuing 
education in this space should be mandated, and 
there are a plethora of resources for this, such as 
the Center for Future Civic Media at the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology (http://civic.mit.
edu/) and the Project on Information Technology 
and Political Islam at the University of Washington 
(http://pITPI.org/). The U.S. government should 
recruit students for government service from these 
high caliber cutting-edge programs, and Muslim-
majority governments should encourage and fund 
their students to study at these centers.  
Second, partnerships for training teachers , curricu-
lum collaboration, and student exchange program 
between Middle Eastern and American institutions 
specializing in diplomacy, journalism, communi-
cations, media, and informational literacy should 
be encouraged (for example between University of 
Southern California’s Annenberg School for Com-
munication & Journalism  and the Mohammed bin 
Rashid School for Communications at the Ameri-
can University in Dubai). Supporting such existing 
institutional training programs that have a track 
record of success and then leveraging new 1) con-
tent partners such as film studios (like Sundance), 
2) technology application partners (like Android 
Labs), 3) global media partners (like Al Jazeera), 
and 4) advertising and marketing partners (like 
Saatchi & Saatchi) will inevitably yield tremendous 
creativity, which can be applied collaboratively to 
regional as well as global challenges and hotspots.  
proliferating opportunities for open-source soft-
ware development making city governments more 
transparent and participatory; and communitypla-
nIT is developing interactive gaming platforms to 
engage younger citizens with newer orientations for 
engagement, even giving them the virtual oppor-
tunities to help design their own neighborhoods.50 
While these technologies grow under various ru-
brics, most frequently under technologies for engage-
ment,51 they are currently limited to advanced me-
dia systems and mostly western societies.
To this end, in our Brooking working group, we 
identified the use of new media connection tech-
nologies to further Global Engagement and derived 
the following recommendations for the develop-
ment and use of connection technologies as we 
usher in a digital era of civic engagement in the 
increasingly interconnected Muslim world. The be-
low recommendations reflect the consensus of the 
New Media working group at the 2010 Brookings 
Doha U.S.-Islamic World Forum.
First, we recommend a systematic embedding 
of technology innovation into U.S. government 
statecraft and the statecraft of Muslim-majority 
countries. The particular area where this is most 
needed is within the diplomatic and development 
agendas. In other words, new media connection 
technologies should be wholly integrated into each 
and every foreign policy strategy, and not be an af-
terthought or a stand-alone add-on. There should 
not be a separate and distinct “new media strategy” 
or “new media department,” rather connectivity 
technologies and digital diplomacy tools should 
be fully systematized and benchmarked into every 
strategy in a country’s statecraft at an institutional 
level. As one example, every newly minted For-
eign Service and Public Affairs officer should com-
mand a certain level of sophistication in new media 
connectivity technologies. Additionally, the U.S. 
50 Retrieved from the Knight Technology for Engagement Initiative: <http://www.knightfoundation.org/initiatives/technologyforengagement.dot>.
51 Retrieved from communityplanIT: <http://communityplanit.blogspot.com/>.
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online user base, before assuming that the voices 
heard online are what the majority of people want. 
“While one South African is tweeting another is 
not eating,” is a phrase that exemplifies the real-
ity of digital media proliferation in Africa and the 
Middle East.52
Fifth, as apps and content are constructed to pro-
mote civil society efforts, focus on creating vehicles 
that will protect the identity of the ICT end-users 
in the Muslim world. Because of the increase need 
for internet security to track down cyber criminals, 
user identification and authentication is quickly 
becoming a standard across the world. However, 
recognize that this is a double-edged sword that 
also exposes the identities of online activists.  Policy 
makers should be mindful of this as it may—in 
some instances—render barren the very media that 
were built to promote civic action.
Sixth, conventional metrics, such as polling, should 
continue to be used to measure Global Engagement 
in the absence of fully-developed metrics to mea-
sure the effectiveness of exchange programs over so-
cial networks using connectivity technologies. The 
platforms for such visual peer-to-peer exchange pro-
grams are numerous and should continue to be em-
ployed, including AllVoices, Soliya, Terrana, Skype, 
YouTube, Ning, Seesmic, ChatThePlanet, Qwid-
get, among others.  In addition, a globally televised 
and YouTubed international music festival with 
celebrity talent and run-up contests can also break 
down cultural barriers and build trust between and 
among different people. However measurements 
for effective public diplomacy and messaging strat-
egies in conjunction with the promotion of NGOs 
and civil society activities and cross-border virtual 
exchanges still need to be perfected.  
Seventh, often times an unintended consequence 
of economic sanctions are information sanctions. 
Third, we recommend building platform applica-
tions (i.e. apps) and content for connectivity specif-
ically for hand-held mobile devices and tablets first 
and then secondly for netbooks, laptops and com-
puters. As per my analysis above, the digital divide 
is being closed not by computers with fiber broad-
band but by mobile phones with wireless connec-
tivity. With more than 4.5 billion cell phones cur-
rently in circulation, SMS over wireless networks 
is already being used in the most remote parts of 
the Muslim world for mobile banking, humanitar-
ian relief efforts, dissemination of user-customized 
breaking news, local electoral matters, and health 
screenings. Add to this the freely available and 
freely upgradeable open-source mobile operating 
systems (available to both developers and manufac-
turers), such as Google’s Android OS and Chrome 
OS, and we believe that the proliferation of smart 
phones and their growing library of user-generated 
and web-based apps will leapfrog the computer as 
the primary tool for multi-directional communica-
tion. Access to technology is dynamic in the Mus-
lim world, and as such statecraft should understand 
how to best catalyze civil societies by building on 
the technologies that are ubiquitous and not sim-
ply wait until every country implements broadband 
internet and every denizen has access to a laptop 
computer.
Fourth, western governments must recognize the 
limitations of their engagement in this space. In 
many parts of the world, access to digital media 
platforms remain severely limited. The voices we 
hear online are not necessarily truly reflective of the 
pulse of the entire society. In fact, it remains meth-
odologically difficult to establish firm numbers of 
the amount of bloggers or online activity originat-
ing from a particular country. In order for these 
new media strategies and digital diplomacy efforts 
to succeed, it is critical for both state and non-state 
actors to first understand the demographics of the 
52  Riyaad Minty: “Providing context: The role of Social Media in Iran,” Retrieved from <http://riyaadm.com/2009/08/02/providing-context-the-
role-of-social-media-in-iran/>.
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them and the digital communities that emerge be-
cause of them. The grants should not be adminis-
tered with the intention of finding and funding the 
silver bullet, but rather to promote the creation of 
a culture of new media expression and civic me-
dia production. Funders should seek out projects 
that use new media to improve peoples’ livelihoods 
by discovering innovative fixes to the mundane is-
sues in their communities, such as unemployment 
or increasing crop yields. Allowing local needs to 
drive organically the use of technologies promotes 
a culture of trust, civic engagement and cultural 
consumption, which is the first step in promoting 
new media as a vehicle for civic participation to af-
fect Global Engagement. More often than not, such 
projects do not demand that new technologies be 
invented, but rather require an application of exist-
ing marketplace technologies to a localized prob-
lem. Therefore funding should focus on innovative 
solutions that borrow from past learnings and do 
not reinvent the wheel. The expectation should be 
that the vehicles that emerge as game changers will 
likely originate organically and authentically, by 
someone who has been influenced or touched by 
a connectivity technology project but probably not 
directly funded to create one. Therefore the fund’s 
success would be measured by the creation of an 
ecosystem of trusted, networked advocates and 
creative self-starters who, because of their shared 
histories of online civic participation, have a collec-
tive stake in the success of independent civic media, 
separate and apart from any funding mechanism.  
Policies should be crafted that permit cross border 
communications despite imposed economic sanc-
tions on a particular country. As has been shown 
above, new media technologies provide virtual spaces 
for conversation, organizing, and political and so-
cial action. These digital safe harbors are critical for 
the rise of civic media, particularly if the Press and 
Broadcast Media are state-run or heavily censored. 
Keeping the internet open allows for information ex-
change and activism both internally and externally. 
Eighth and finally, we recommend that an inde-
pendent new media fund be created that focuses on 
training, content incubation, and co-productions 
between the U.S. and the Muslim world. The pur-
pose of the fund would be to provide micro-grants 
to support the training of content creators and 
promote that actual creation of civic media plat-
forms. We recommend more small grants of lesser 
amounts that focus specifically on the creation of a 
participatory youth culture. The goal is not just the 
product which will be created, but the actual pro-
cess of democratization of cultural engagement and 
consumption that is bolstered by the use of Cre-
ative Commons licensing, open-source technolo-
gies, and online trainings. New media makes it rela-
tively cheap to fail.  So funders should expect that 
there will be many failed attempts at building civic 
media vehicles in the Muslim world. Fundamen-
tally, funders should view the grants as investments, 
not in the projects themselves or the institutions, 
to which they are attached, but the people who run 
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The Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World is a major research program housed within the Saban 
Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. The project conducts high-quality public policy 
research, and convenes policy makers and opinion leaders on the major issues surrounding the relationship 
between the United States and the Muslim world. The Project seeks to engage and inform policymakers, 
practitioners, and the broader public on developments in Muslim countries and communities, and the nature 
of their relationship with the United States. Together with the affiliated Brookings Doha Center in Qatar, 
it sponsors a range of events, initiatives, research projects, and publications designed to educate, encourage 
frank dialogue, and build positive partnerships between the United States and the Muslim world. The Project 
has several interlocking components:
n   The U.S.-Islamic World Forum, which brings together key leaders in the fields of politics, business, media, 
academia, and civil society from across the Muslim world and the United States, for much needed discus-
sion and dialogue;
n   A Visiting Fellows program, for scholars and journalists from the Muslim world to spend time researching 
and writing at Brookings in order to inform U.S. policy makers on key issues facing Muslim states and 
communities;
n   A series of Brookings Analysis Papers and Monographs that provide needed analysis of the vital issues of 
joint concern between the U.S. and the Muslim world;
n   An Arts and Culture Initiative, which seeks to develop a better understanding of how arts and cultural 
leaders and organizations can increase understanding between the United States and the global Muslim 
community;
n   A Science and Technology Initiative, which examines the role cooperative science and technology pro-
grams involving the U.S. and Muslim world can play in responding to regional development and educa-
tion needs, as well as fostering positive relations;
n   A Faith Leaders Initiative which brings together representatives of the major Abrahamic faiths from the 
United States and the Muslim world to discuss actionable programs for bridging the religious divide;
n   A Brookings Institution Press Book Series, which aims to synthesize the project’s findings for public dis-
semination. 
The underlying goal of the Project is to continue the Brookings Institution’s original mandate to serve as a 
bridge between scholarship and public policy. It seeks to bring new knowledge to the attention of decision-
makers and opinion-leaders, as well as afford scholars, analysts, and the public a better insight into policy 
issues. The Project is supported through the generosity of a range of sponsors including the Government of 
the State of Qatar, The Ford Foundation, The Doris Duke Charitable Foundation, and the Carnegie Cor-
poration.
The Project Conveners are Martin Indyk, Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies; Kenneth 
Pollack, Senior Fellow and Director, Saban Center; Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow in the Saban Center; Stephen 
R. Grand, Fellow and Director of the Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World; Shibley Telhami, 
Nonresident Senior Fellow and Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at the University of Mary-
land; and Salman Shaikh, Director of the Brookings Doha Center.
about the Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World
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to four presidents on the Middle East and South 
Asia at the National Security Council and during 
a twenty-nine year career in the CIA; Suzanne Ma-
loney, a former senior State Department official 
who focuses on Iran and economic development; 
Daniel Byman, a Middle East terrorism expert 
from Georgetown University; Stephen R. Grand, 
Fellow and Director of the Project on U.S. Rela-
tions with the Islamic World; Salman Shaikh, Fel-
low and Director of the Brookings Doha Center; 
Ibrahim Sharqieh, Fellow and Deputy Director of 
the Brookings Doha Center; Shadi Hamid, Fellow 
and Director of Research of the Brookings Doha 
Center; and Shibley Telhami, who holds the Sadat 
Chair at the University of Maryland. The center is 
located in the Foreign Policy Studies Program at 
Brookings. 
The Saban Center is undertaking path breaking 
research in five areas: the implications of regime 
change in Iraq, including post-war nation-building 
and Gulf security; the dynamics of Iranian domes-
tic politics and the threat of nuclear proliferation; 
mechanisms and requirements for a two-state so-
lution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; policy for 
the war against terrorism, including the continuing 
challenge of state sponsorship of terrorism; and po-
litical and economic change in the Arab world, and 
the methods required to promote democratization.
The Saban Center for Middle East Policy
The Saban Center for Middle East Policy was 
established on May 13, 2002 with an inaugural 
address by His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jor-
dan. The creation of the Saban Center reflects the 
Brookings Institution’s commitment to expand dra-
matically its research and analysis of Middle East 
policy issues at a time when the region has come to 
dominate the U.S. foreign policy agenda.
The Saban Center provides Washington policymak-
ers with balanced, objective, in-depth and timely 
research and policy analysis from experienced and 
knowledgeable scholars who can bring fresh per-
spectives to bear on the critical problems of the 
Middle East. The center upholds the Brookings 
tradition of being open to a broad range of views. 
The Saban Center’s central objective is to advance 
understanding of developments in the Middle East 
through policy-relevant scholarship and debate.
The center’s foundation was made possible by a 
generous grant from Haim and Cheryl Saban of 
Los Angeles. Ambassador Martin S. Indyk, Vice 
President of Foreign Policy at Brookings, was the 
founding Director of the Saban Center. Kenneth 
M. Pollack is the center’s Director. Within the Sa-
ban Center is a core group of Middle East experts 
who conduct original research and develop inno-
vative programs to promote a better understand-
ing of the policy choices facing American decision 
makers. They include Bruce Riedel, a specialist on 
counterterrorism, who served as a senior advisor 
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